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In response to critics who denounce the ethical theory of utilitarianism, or the 
"Greatest Happiness Principle” (Mill 10), as hedonistically "mean and grovelling” (6), 
John Stuart Mill dedicates much of his treatise Utilitarianism to amending the limited 
understanding of human happiness that these objectors seem to have. To redeem the 
doctrine, Mill defines human happiness as comprised of two facets: an ability to 
recognize a qualitative scale of pleasures and seek out the higher ones, and a 
compulsion for one to seek these pleasures not only for oneself but, moreover, for one’s 
fellow beings. Most significantly, I argue, utilitarianism finds its worthiness in aligning 
itself with an inherently social human nature where public and private interests and 
pleasures are inextricably interwoven.
To begin it is necessary to give a brief account of what utilitarian ethics entail and 
why they might be objectionable to certain thinkers. Mill defines the doctrine as that 
which "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain” (6, emphasis added). I observe here that Mill has a 
conception of the good that is tied to the emotion or experience of happiness; but also 
inversely that pleasure, as I will outline, is fundamentally rooted in an understanding of 
what is good.
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To understand Mill’s defense first requires an understanding of how his 
detractors conceive of and define pleasure and what therein might make the happiness 
principle appear "mean and grovelling”. Quoting in part from another author, Mill 
differentiates between two factions of objectors to the doctrine: those who "denounce 
the theory as ‘impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and 
[those who denounce it as] too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure 
precedes the word utility’” (5). The dichotomy between these two accusations suggests 
their understanding of pleasure as a frivolity which is opposed to usefulness or duty, 
and sets the stage for further accusations that utilitarianism is therefore "a doctrine 
worthy only of swine” (6).
Mill’s response to this is to redefine -  or rather, perhaps, clarify -  what is meant 
by pleasure. To put it simply, Mill argues for the existence of qualitative levels of 
pleasure, and that human beings by nature are not only capable but require the 
cultivation of so-called "higher faculties” (7) and hence higher pleasures. He notes the 
absurdity "that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” 
(7). These pleasures are called higher as contrasted to the simple needs and desires 
that his critics might have called frivolous, which are certainly relevant and important to 
human life but which do not encompass all its joys.
Evidently, Mill is interested not in a defense of frivolity or "the mere pleasures of 
the moment” to which these thinkers take objection (5), but in an argument that some 
pleasures are not necessarily frivolous or base. That Mill is so deeply concerned with 
"rescuing [utilitarianism] from this utter degradation” (5) indicates that he believes in an
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external standard by which to judge the system; that is, if humans experienced 
happiness only from supposedly frivolous endeavours, he would accept that there must 
be a higher standard than pleasure towards which human life should tend. For that 
reason, his clarification of what it means to feel pleasure and happiness, for humans 
specifically, is vital.
This leads me to a brief discussion of the word "grovelling” and its implications. 
To grovel is not only to indulge in so-called base pleasures -  to grovel is also an 
isolating act. One who grovels becomes a slave to his or her desires and ceases to 
engage with the world except to beg for its comforts; the person withdraws into his or 
herself. That this is far from the ideal which Mill promotes I take to mean that his vision 
of the ends of a fully human life makes this slavish life undignified by comparison, even 
though he never directly addresses such a teleology. The opposite of this state, then, is 
engagement with the world, as opposed to simply living in it and accepting its sensual 
pleasures.
Part of the "intrinsic superiority of the higher” pleasures (8) is the pursuit of social 
endeavours; the social nature of human life thus has a crucial role in utilitarianism. Mill 
considers the foundation of his morality to be "that of the social feelings of mankind,” 
(27) which fact paves the way for Mill’s assertion that the utilitarian goal "is not the 
agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether” (10). 
Moreover, he argues that "[t]he social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so 
habitual to man, that ... he never conceives of himself otherwise than as a member of a 
body” (27). Not only are we obligated to strive towards greater overall happiness, but 
the obligation in fact arises from a natural and even inevitable tendency. Some of the
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most profound happiness we can experience seems to arise, one way or another, from 
the social disposition of human beings; hence, all individual happiness becomes 
indelibly linked with the happiness of others.
To understand this I return to the idea of the higher faculties. We might think of 
endeavours such as art and philosophy as the quintessential uses of these faculties; 
more generally, Mill emphasizes the possession of "mental cultivation,” and a "lively ... 
interest in life,” claiming that "any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been 
opened ... finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of 
nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the 
ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the future” (12). Common in 
all these is the pursuit of engagement with the world, of a kind which seems to be less 
experienced among other animals and is far from grovelling. Such engagement, though 
it is not necessarily social in nature, is nevertheless a reach towards unity with 
something outside oneself, a move which lends itself to the desire to increase the 
greater overall happiness.
Utilitarianism reconciles private and communal happiness by appealing to this 
desire for unity. The individual begins to experience this "higher” happiness; recognizes 
the social feeling and the desire to engage with the world; realizes a need to improve 
the lot of or promote happiness in that world; and then becomes part of the project of 
cultivating these feelings in others so that they, too, realize this need. In short, those 
who feel the higher happiness inevitably want that feeling to be shared. It is an ethics of 
education, where "education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an
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indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole” (15). It 
is this fundamental link between the personal and the social which provides the basis of 
Mill’s book and the entire doctrine of utilitarianism.
Throughout the above, with the very use of the word "higher,” runs the thread of 
an assumption that there indeed exists a hierarchical scale of faculties; we therefore 
need to uncover Mill’s justification for or explanation of that scale. What it is that actually 
makes them higher; why should we hold certain pleasures in lower or in higher esteem? 
Mill states that the quality of pleasures is determined by those who have experienced 
both lower and higher pleasures and seem to unquestionably "give a most marked 
preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties” (7). I 
concede that, in this line, Mill somewhat begs the question of what actually makes those 
faculties higher. However, in his emphasis on choice, I find him making this suggestion: 
that to be human is to experience the engaged, social faculties he explores later in his 
book, and that we come to know these faculties are fully human and thus more valuable 
because of the persuasive kind of happiness that they compel us to feel. Mill insists that 
"[w]hatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to 
something admitted to be good without proof” (4) and that "the sole evidence it is 
possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it” (30). 
Happiness and desire are then ways of recognizing what kinds of actions human beings 
should pursue.
From this it seems we develop systems of morals, rights, and justice, for "the 
moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it” (26). I’d venture 
that perhaps part of the objection to utilitarianism, then, is due to its approach to
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morality, deriving morals and rights not extrinsically but from individual feelings. It might 
make some sense to object to a doctrine which claims that all rights can be sanctioned 
only socially, when we conceive of social consensus as changeable. Yet, from Mill I am 
led to conclude that if we recognize this fundamental utilitarian desire of all humans, that 
is, the desire for unity and for the experience of varying degrees of pleasure, then we 
find a kernel that is not as changeable as may be thought. The feeling of happiness is 
not truly a mystery to any person, and, consequently, I agree with Mill when he claims 
that it is "truly a whimsical supposition, that if mankind were agreed in considering utility 
to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful” 
(20).
To a certain extent utilitarianism is thus an acknowledgement of the sources of 
that which humans already do, the reason for morals which are already in place in 
society. Mill claims that "the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is 
already a powerful principle in human nature, [is] happily one of those which tend to 
become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing 
civilization” (27). Significantly differing from a philosopher such as Rousseau, Mill 
suggests that civilization, while not a natural fact of human life, elicits qualities which, 
though they are not present in humans inherently, are compatible with those qualities 
which are. The pleasure we feel is simply how we recognize the value of these 
experiences.
By suggesting that pleasure can itself be a reminder of the social nature of 
humans, and thus a guide towards living a better life, Mill raises the doctrine of 
utilitarianism far above the level to which critics had initially judged it. From his
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explanation arises a sense of a sort of inevitability to utilitarianism; moral conceptions of 
right and wrong are only improved through recognition of this basic human fact which is 
the search for personal happiness and the desire to share it with others.
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